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This book’s topic is a timely one, since no-one can now be in any doubt of 
the relevance of religious movements and passions to understanding the modern 
world. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the international order has been 
reconfigured along lines of religiously-motivated antagonism, on the part of the 
West’s enemies if not of its own purposes. The rise of militant Islam, in part filling 
the large political and cultural spaces left by the collapse or destruction of secular 
dictatorships of the Middle East, is the most obvious manifestation of this 
resurgence of religious passions, culminating in the project to restore an Islamic 
caliphate across the region, rejecting the quasi-national state boundaries 
imposed after the end of the First World War. But just as important are the 
divisions internal to the Islamic world, between the Shia and Shi-ite branches of 
Islam, whose leading powers are respectively Iran and Saudi Arabia.  
Religious loyalties and traditions also had a significant role during the 
dissolution of several of the Communist states of Eastern Europe. The Catholic 
Church was influential in mobilising opposition to the regime in Poland, 
Protestant churches were significant in the liberation movements of East 
Germany. The lines of bitter division which emerged in the former Yugoslavia 
reflected the earlier sway in those regions of Roman Catholicism, the Greek 
Orthodox church, and Islam. Although the West’s hostility to militant Islam, and 
its military interventions to resist its rise, have not for the most part been 
formulated by Western nations in religious terms, for the Islamists it has been 
possible to evoke with effect the memory of earlier Western interventions, notably 
the Crusades, which had the ostensible goal of Christian conversion. This 
development is counter to what was predicted by liberal and Marxist theories of 
modernisation. Religious fundamentalism then came to be understood by 
theorists of globalisation like Manuel Castells and Anthony Giddens as 
essentially a reaction against modernity.  
The West’s response to militant Islam has been principally formulated not 
in terms of Christian religious commitment, but in terms of antipathy towards the 
violence, and intolerance attributed to its leaders and movements, that is in 
ostensibly liberal, secular, even humanitarian terms. Yet Trump’s proposal that 
‘Muslims’ as such should be barred from entering the United States, and even 
David Cameron’s New Year encouragement to British people (but which British 
people?) to remember their ‘Christian traditions’, seek to revive a latent structure 
of religious feeling. A serious problem for Western nations in wishing to insulate 
their now substantial Muslim populations from ‘extremism’ is to know how to 
couch a countervailing appeal to them, especially where Muslim migrants’ 
experience of their new lives in the West has often been one of social exclusion 
and poverty. 
Walzer’s central argument is that the secular revolutionaries of the 
national liberation movements gravely underestimated the strength and depth of 
the traditionalist religious affiliations of the people they sought to mobilise which 
they saw as one of the principal obstacles to their emancipation and to nationalist 
resistance. The national liberation project (in this respect like the project of 
communist revolution) required the making of a new kind of citizen, no longer 
bound by the traditions of the past. In a striking parallel, (earlier developed in 
Exodus and Revolution, 1986) Walzer dates the origins of the Zionist project and 
its contradictions to the original exodus of the Jews from Egypt, with Moses as 
the bringer of a new code of laws and beliefs whose stringency, as we know from 
the Bible, was not welcome to his followers. But of course the identities of religion 
and nation were here indistinguishable, unlike the position of modern Zionist 
pioneers. But even so, the rejection by the early Zionists of a project to resettle 
European Jews in Uganda shows how irresistible the religious aura of the land of 
Israel was even to secular nationalists. India was another mixed or compromise 
instance, since while Nehru was a secular moderniser, it was Gandhi’s capacity 
to mobilise Hindu sentiment which delivered a mass following to the Congress 
Party.  
This book can thus be seen as a kind of self-criticism of the rationalistic 
shallowness of both liberal and socialist projects of emancipation and social 
reconstruction. These, Walzer suggests, were unable to offer a sufficiently 
emotionally-resonant vision of an emancipated life to retain the loyalty of their 
peoples. A significant influence on the author’s thinking has been the ‘culturalist’ 
anthropology of Clifford Geertz, whose principal idea was that cultures are the 
most powerful organisers of societies and their internal relations. Walzer’s thesis 
is that neither liberal individualism nor socialist collectivism has proved capable 
of developing what we might call ‘social imaginaries’ persuasive enough to resist 
the appeal of religiously-based sentiments and solidarities. 
The secularists proclaiming democracy and liberation were often seen as 
merely new kinds of power-seeking elites. While they drew their line of 
demarcation between the authenticity of the new nation and the alienness of the 
colonisers, they could find themselves on the wrong side of a different line of 
division that between ‘the people’ and an ‘alien’ ruling class of reforming 
westernised leaders. Erdogan in Turkey has overthrown the secular ruling class 
settled in power for two generations following Ataturk’s revolution. Contemporary 
populists in the United States and Europe now also organise against allegedly 
‘out of touch’ elites which are alleged to disdain and disrespect ordinary people. 
Where religion is the main organiser of opposition to secular elites, such 
secularist elites have sometimes only been able to retain or recover power only 
through the exercise of brute force, as in Egypt and Algeria. 
Walzer, who remains strongly committed to the project of secular 
emancipation, is at pains to defend each of the three movements he discusses, 
in India, Algeria and Israel, against the charge that their nationalism was already 
deeply compromised by its implicit religious affiliations, arguing that each had 
been committed to the idea of a secular state. Against Marxists who contend that 
national liberation movements were always liable to be contaminated by religious 
exclusivism, he argues that class solidarities as envisaged by Marxism have 
proved unattainable, and that the particularistic loyalties constructed through the 
making of national identities were indispensable to the defeat of the colonisers. 
Walzer is antipathetic to the claims of each of the fundamentalist religions 
he discusses, not least because of their oppressiveness towards women - the 
values of gender equality are set out as  principal grounds for moral and political 
universalism. Walzer nevertheless argues that emancipatory regimes do need to 
find some accommodation with religious beliefs and practices. In the background 
to Walzer’s argument is the ‘American solution’ which maintains a firm boundary 
between state and church, mosque or synagogue, and which requires that 
religions abjure coercion, at least in physical terms. Laws protecting individual 
freedoms within a framework allowing cultural and religious diversity, is Walzer’s 
preferred option –as set out in his Spheres of Justice (1984).  
In On Toleration (1999) Walzer expressed sympathy for the tolerance of 
both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, in contrast to systems which 
assert the rights of individuals but reject the idea that groups and cultures have 
their own entitlements. He develops this idea here, discussing the ideas of 
Austro-Marxists such as Otto Bauer who envisaged a reformed (Austro-
Hungarian) empire which would respect national cultures, equal citizenship for all 
inhabitants, and cultural autonomy for the previous subject-nations. This model 
has affinities with the aspirations that some socialists once had for the European 
Union. 
Persuasive as Walzer’s argument is in many ways, there remains a 
question of whether it is right. Did these national liberation movements fail to 
contain the rise of religious fundamentalism mainly because of their own elitist 
blindness to popular religious sentiments? Might it have been the case, as 
Walzer’s argument implies, that more culturally-sensitive national liberationists 
might have succeeded where the Zionists, the FLN, and Nehru’s Congress Party 
failed? Is the only alternative to Walzer’s argument the mobilising claims of 
working class solidarity, which failed so catastrophically to resist the appeals of 
nationalism in 1914, to give one instance? 
It seems to me that more particular explanations can be given for the 
failure of to resist the appeals of reactionary nationalism. In the case of India, the 
critical factor was surely not the blindness of Nehru and his associates to the 
continuing presence in Indian life of Hindu religion, but rather their failure to 
confront the material powers, especially in regard to land-ownership, which gave 
this religion its popular sway. What has discredited the national liberationists in 
India is not their indifference or antipathy to religion, but their failure to do enough 
to raise the living standards of their people and also, of course, their corruption 
and their reliance on the influence of landowners, in what became an 
institutionalised system of patronage and bribes. The decisive compromise was 
thus with the feudal residues of Indian society, which the Raj had previously used 
to its own advantage.1 
Instructive here is the contrast with China, where the national liberation 
movement was Communist and which  chose from the start to settle its accounts 
with feudalism by taking all land into state ownership. Once the regime decided, 
after the death of Mao in 1976, to embark on rapid economic development 
through an alliance with an emergent bourgeoisie, there could be no resistance 
from an earlier landed class, since it had gone. This left the field free for industrial 
development,  massive building and  infrastructure,  in contrast with India. The 
dominant religion of China, Confucianism, traditionally identified with ideas of 
good and wise government, made it possible for the Chinese Communist Party to 
achieve some kind of accommodation with these traditions. The point is that the 
regime has made its central goal the improvement of the living standards of its 
entire people, and has successfully made this the chief grounds for its legitimacy. 
One can view this, from a Marxist perspective, as having been a successful 
hegemonic strategy, in both responding to the material needs of the people, and 
assimilating into its rule some of its dominant cultural and religious traditions.  
If we look at the case of Zionism in Israel, there seem also to be particular 
reasons which explain the failures of secular government. The conditions for its 
1 Kerala, with the role of Communists in government, its high Human Development Index, and its 
weak religious parties, is the exception within India.   
                                            
success were above all peaceful coexistence and economic symbiosis with its 
Arab neighbours, which could have made the ideals of individual freedom, 
cultural and cosmopolitan diversity, and increasing prosperity, sufficiently 
realised to have maintained a secular order. But instead we have had decades of 
antagonism and war from which religious fundamentalism is able to benefit. The 
decadent and authoritarian regimes of Israel’s neighbours (as Perry Anderson 
has recently pointed out in New Left Review 96), and the willingness of the 
United States to uphold both sides of this catastrophic antagonism, for its own 
geopolitical reasons, is a part of the ‘exceptionalist’ reason for this situation to 
persist, with the rise of religious fundamentalism its consequence on both Arab 
and Israeli sides of the divide. The traumatic history of the Holocaust is another 
‘abnormal’ factor in this situation, since it gives legitimacy to a sense of unending 
persecution and danger.  
We can look for particularistic explanations of the rejection of secularism 
and the rise of religious fundamentalism in the case of Algeria too. Most relevant 
here is the violence and brutality of the war of colonial independence with 
France, and the return to France of its settler population and many of its 
collaborators after France’s defeat, leaving the economy and administration in 
ruins. The new regime was thus militarised, and used to the extreme use of 
force, from its beginning –unlike India, for example, liberated without an armed 
struggle. The contrast with the post-colonial regimes of Morocco and Tunisia, 
both formerly ruled by France, but decolonised peaceably, is surely striking. 
Here, post-independence, compromises of a kind were achieved leaving much 
less scope for insurgent religious movements. 
I wish to suggest, in other words, that it is not just a representative failure 
of secular liberation movements to understand and achieve viable relationships 
with religious traditions which explains their loss of hegemony in each of these 
three nations. In each case, these secular regimes needed for their survival and 
success to create certain conditions, which they were not able to do. The balance 
of causal influences was in each instance different. In India, the primary 
explanation lies in the material sphere of ownership and its relationship to 
political power. In Israel, the explanation lies in the continuing state of armed 
conflict. In Algeria, it is the legacy of the war of liberation with France and its 
effects on the emergent regime which has the main responsibility.  
None of this is to question Walzer’s argument that progressive political 
movements need to respect the religious and cultural traditions of the peoples 
they lead or govern, or risk rejection by them if they fail to do so. But there is a 
broader condition for their success too, which is their need to have regard to the 
other major aspects of popular well-being and security, not least in material 
terms. It is where the anxieties brought about by insecurity and impoverishment 
are greatest, that movements offering powerful identifications against defined 
enemies (religious, nationalist or ideological) have their compelling appeal. It is 
these broader failures of secular regimes, liberal or socialist, and not just their 
tone-deafness to religious sentiments and beliefs, which explain their 
vulnerability to fundamentalist and exclusionary challenges. 
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